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BETTER LATE THAN NEVER:
NEW YORK FINALLY CLOSES THE "GAP"
IN RECOVERY PERMITTED FOR
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN PRENATAL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES
ALICIA A. ELLISt
INTRODUCTION
New York courts, as well as courts in other states, have often
been reluctant to allow recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress ("NIED"). This reluctance stems primarily
from public policy concerns. Courts have voiced three main
concerns about allowing recovery for NIED:
(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often
temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of
mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived
unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate financial
burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent,
for consequences which appear remote from the "wrongful" act.1
Despite these concerns, however, the ability of an injured
party to "seek redress for every substantial wrong" has been
fundamental to New York's common law system, 2 as well as to

t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2003,
Marist College.
1 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 54, at
360-61 (5th ed. 1984); see also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-19, 249
N.E.2d 419, 422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-62 (1969) (outlining policy factors that

must be considered when deciding whether to permit recovery for NIED);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); Carolyn A. Goodzeit, Note,
Rethinking Emotional Distress Law: PrenatalMalpracticeand Feminist Theory, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 180 (1994) (discussing public policy concerns surrounding
decisions in NIED cases).
2 Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
36 (1961).
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tort law in general. 3 For this reason, the courts have allowed
recovery in certain situations, regardless of the opportunities for
fraud and extra litigation.4 Though New York courts have taken
this position in some situations, they have often denied recovery
for NIED in situations where they have felt compelled to do so by
public policy. 5
Competing policy interests always underlie
decisions in this area, as courts struggle to strike a just balance
between compensating those injured through the fault of others,
and keeping liability reasonably limited and the potential for
fictitious suits at a minimum. 6 Therefore, courts have struggled
for years to determine under what circumstances recovery will be
permitted, keeping in mind notions of fundamental fairness as
well as the public policy interests of keeping liability and
7
litigation within manageable bounds.
One historically problematic area within NIED has been
prenatal medical malpractice. 8 Until recently, New York law in
this area was fraught with inconsistencies concerning under
what circumstances recovery would be permitted. 9 Furthermore,
3 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 1, at 5-6.
4 See Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37

(citing Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 73 A. 688, 692 (Md. 1909)) ("The argument
from mere expediency cannot commend itself to a [c]ourt of justice, resulting in the
denial of a logical legal right and remedy in all cases because in some a fictitious
injury may be urged as a real one.").
5 See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 617-19, 249 N.E.2d at 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 56062 (1969).
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is
an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has
ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The
problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree.
Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561; see also Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 112, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977) (explaining that
the law cannot remedy every wrong because of the necessity of "circumscrib[ing] and
limit[ing] the rules ascribing liability in a manner which accords with reason and
practicality").
6 "On the one hand, the courts seek to assure that there is a remedy for a
significant injury. On the other hand, there is the fear of opening the floodgates of
litigation based upon injuries which are often amorphous." Thomas A. Moore &
Matthew Gaier, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2000,
at 3.
7 See id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 359-60 (noting the
difficulty courts encounter when defining liability for NIED).
8 See Goodzeit, supra note 1, at 182.
9 See Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress-Part II, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 2000, at 3; see also infra notes 67-92 and
accompanying text.
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the case law in New York left a "logical gap" in the recovery it
permitted to mothers when prenatal medical malpractice injured
their children. 10
For decades, when medical malpractice resulted in the
stillbirth or miscarriage of a child, the child's mother was only
able to recover for her emotional injuries if she could
demonstrate that she had also suffered an independent physical
injury-one that was not considered to be a normal incident of
childbirth. 1 ' This rule was premised on the court's finding that
the doctor in such a situation owed a duty of care to the fetus, but
not to the mother. 12 This was also the rule if a mother suffered
emotional injuries due to her child being born alive but with
13
severe birth defects due to her doctor's negligence.
Demonstrating the existence of an independent physical injury
was difficult, making recovery for NIED in this area rare.' 4 This
rule proved to "fit[] uncomfortably into [New York's] tort
jurisprudence."15
At the same time that this rule was in effect, a pregnant
woman had a cause of action for NIED if her doctor erroneously
advised her to undergo an abortion, 16 or if her doctor negligently
performed an abortion. 17 Further, a child born alive, but with
birth defects due to another's negligence, had his or her own
cause of action against the tortfeasor.18 Finally, if an automobile
operator, instead of a doctor, caused the stillbirth or miscarriage
of a child, the child's mother had a cause of action for NIED. 19
10 See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
11 See Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 932, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1143, 493
N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011 (1985) (denying damages for emotional harm where a mother
did not claim any physical injury separate from that of her fetus), overruled by
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004).
12 See id. at 932-33, 483 N.E.2d at 1143-44, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011-12.
13 See Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 809-11, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980).
14 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
15 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 154, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d
416, 419 (2004).
16 See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d 697, 699,
512 N.E.2d 538, 538-39, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955, 955-56 (1987) (allowing recovery for
emotional harm because the Court considered a doctor's erroneous abortion advice a
breach of duty owed directly to the expectant mother as opposed to the unborn
fetus); see also infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
17 See Ferrara v. Bernstein, 81 N.Y.2d 895, 897-98, 613 N.E.2d 542, 543-44,
597 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637-38 (1993); see also infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
18 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
19 See Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301
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The state of law at this time, therefore, "engendered a peculiar
result: it exposed medical caregivers to malpractice liability for
in utero injuries when the fetus survived, but immunized them
against any liability when their malpractice caused a miscarriage
20
or stillbirth."
This "gap" often resulted in unfair outcomes since it
21
categorically denied recovery to certain deserving plaintiffs,
even though allowing recovery would often be more aligned with
fundamental notions of fairness. Finally, in April 2004, the New
York Court of Appeals closed the "gap" that has plagued this area
of the law for decades and permitted the interest in redressing
substantial injury to outweigh the interests in limited liability
and litigation. 22 In Broadnax v. Gonzalez,23 the New York Court
of Appeals held that "even in the absence of an independent
injury, medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth
should be construed as a violation of a duty of care to the
expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional
24
distress."
This Note asserts that the Broadnax decision was long
overdue for New York. The decision fits comfortably with the
rest of New York's jurisprudence in the NIED area because it
creates a workable, bright-line rule that is sufficiently limited in
scope so as not to create a significant risk of extra litigation and
unlimited liability for medical practitioners. In addition, it seeks
to compensate a relatively small but deserving class of plaintiffs
who suffer a substantial loss due to their doctors' malpractice.
Part I of this Note will trace the history and development of
NIED in New York, as well as the underlying public policy
considerations that have driven its progression along the way.
New York's approach to NIED in prenatal medical malpractice
N.Y.S.2d 65, 72 (1969) ("[The plaintiff mother] may recover for the injuries she
sustained, both physical and mental, including the emotional upset attending the

stillbirths.").
Broadnax,2 N.Y.3d at 154, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
See Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010
(1985) (holding that a mother must show that she suffered a physical injury in order
to recover for emotional injuries in an action for medical malpractice), overruled by
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004); see
also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
22 See Broadnax, 2 N.Y.3d at 153-55, 809 N.E.2d at 647-49, 777 N.Y.S.2d at
418-20; see also infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
23 2 N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416.
24 Id. at 155, 809 N.E.2d at 649, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
20
21
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cases will also be examined, including the gap New York's case
law left in plaintiff recovery. Part II will discuss the Court of
Appeals' recent decision in Broadnax, its holding, rationale, and
dissenting opinion, as well as how this case finally filled the gap
in recovery allowed for NIED in prenatal malpractice cases. Part
III will explain why the Broadnax decision was long overdue for
New York and conclude with a discussion of its possible
implications.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF NIED IN NEW YORK
A. The Beginnings of NIED: Direct Injury
One of the first decisions in which the New York Court of
Appeals recognized the right of a plaintiff to recover for NIED
In this action for medical
was Ferrara v. Galluchio.2 5
malpractice, the plaintiff sued for the emotional injuries she
suffered after being told by her dermatologist that burns on her
shoulder caused by x-ray treatments administered by the
defendant doctor may become cancerous. 26 In Ferrara, the
plaintiffs emotional injuries followed from severe physical
injuries caused by the defendant doctor's malpractice. 2 7 The
Court declared, "Freedom from mental disturbance is now a
protected interest in [New York]."28
5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
See id. at 18-19, 152 N.E.2d at 250-51, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98. The Court
held that the defendant doctor would be liable for the plaintiffs emotional injuries
even though it was her dermatologist who actually advised her that she was at risk
for developing cancer. See id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
27 See id. at 20-21, 152 N.E.2d at 251-52, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
28 Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999. In so holding, the Court
addressed the concerns that surround recovery for emotional injury:
The only valid objection against recovery for mental injury is the danger of
vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which has loomed very large in the
opinions as an obstacle. The danger is a real one, and must be met. Mental
disturbance is easily simulated, and courts which are plagued with
fraudulent personal injury claims may well be unwilling to open the door to
an even more dubious field. But the difficulty is not insuperable. Not only
fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by definite
physical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It is entirely
possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when
there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of
genuineness in the circumstances of the case. The problem is one of
adequate proof, and it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases
because some claims may be false.
Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000 (citation omitted). Three
25

26
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When a physical injury accompanies the emotional distress,
or more specifically, when the emotional distress flows from a
physical injury caused by the defendant's negligent conduct, most
courts will allow recovery for the emotional damages by
characterizing them as "parasitic" damages flowing from the
physical injury. 29 Courts seem to be less concerned with the risk
of feigned emotional injuries when the emotional injuries result
30
from easily verifiable physical injuries.
After Ferrara,emotional damages accompanying a physical
injury were recoverable, but the longstanding rule remained that
there was no recovery for emotional injuries absent a physical
31
injury. That rule came from Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.,
in which the Court of Appeals stated: "[N]o recovery can be had
for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of
32
another, where there is no immediate personal injury."
This rule changed after the Court of Appeals recognized the
right to recover for purely emotional injuries in Battalla v.
State.33 In Battalla, a state employee improperly and insecurely
placed the infant plaintiff into a chair lift. 34 As a result, the
infant plaintiff became "frightened and hysterical," and suffered
consequential injuries. 35 This case demonstrated the Court's
view that when a duty is owed to the plaintiff, the defendant is
judges joined in a dissent by Judge Froessel in which he cautioned that this "new
field of damage[]" would create countless opportunities for plaintiffs to file
fraudulent claims. Id. at 23-24, 152 N.E.2d at 254, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02
(Froessel, J., dissenting).
29 See KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 54, at 362-63.
30 See id. at 363.

31 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
32 Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. The rationale for this rule was almost completely
grounded in public policy concerns:
If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it
would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury
complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the
damages must rest upon mere conjecture or speculation. The difficulty
which often exists in cases of alleged physical injury, in determining
whether they exist, and if so, whether they were caused by the negligent
act of the defendant, would not only be greatly increased, but a wide field
would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims. To establish such a
doctrine would be contrary to principles of public policy.
Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
33 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
34 Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
35 Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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responsible for all damages proximately caused by his or her
36
negligence, including those that are purely emotional in nature.
In recognizing a cause of action for purely emotional injuries, the
Court explained that "[a]lthough fraud, extra litigation and a
measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason
for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction." 37 Even after
Battalla, however, the Court remained reluctant to permit
38
recovery for purely emotional injuries in many situations.
When a plaintiff seeks to recover for purely emotional
injuries suffered due to another's negligence, the preliminary
issue for the courts is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed the
injured plaintiff a duty of care. 39 In deciding whether to permit
recovery for NIED, the court's analysis has typically been
couched in terms of duty. 40
Even when the defendant is
unquestionably negligent, and emotional distress is a foreseeable
consequence of that negligence, courts will sometimes limit
liability by finding that no duty was owed to the plaintiff.4 1 This
See id. at 240-42, 176 N.E.2d at 730-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36-38.
Id. at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37. Three judges joined in a
dissent by Judge Van Voorhis in which he expressed concerns grounded in public
policy that allowing recovery in this type of case would potentially open the
floodgates to litigation and increase the occurrence of fraudulent claims. See id. at
242-43, 176 N.E.2d at 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
38 See Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 153, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648, 777
N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (2004) (referring to the Court of Appeals' "longstanding reluctance
to recognize causes of action for [NIED], especially in cases where the plaintiff
suffered no independent physical or economic injury"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 54, at 360 (discussing the reluctance courts have in recognizing "the interest in
peace of mind"); Moore & Gaier, supra note 6 ("One of the most nebulous and
problematic areas of tort law is that involving recovery for negligently inflicted
damages which are purely emotional, psychological or mental in nature.").
39 Moore & Gaier, supra note 9.
40 See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 233, 461 N.E.2d 843, 850, 473
N.Y.S.2d 357, 364 (1984) ("In conformity with traditional tort principles, the
touchstone of liability in these cases is the breach by the defendant of a duty of due
36
37

care owed the plaintiff."); SUSAN FRIEDMAN,

1 NEW YORK PRACTICE GUIDE:

NEGLIGENCE § 2.04[3][a] (Oscar G. Chase & Henry G. Miller eds., 2006) ("All of the
cases awarding damages for emotional injuries hinge on the proposition that when
there is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty which
results directly in emotional harm is compensable."); see also Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 613, 249 N.E.2d 419, 420-21, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (1969) (describing
the ultimate issue before the Court as being a question of duty); Moore & Gaier,
supra note 6 (explaining that "[tihere will be no liability unless the [c]ourt finds that
there exists a duty owed directly to the person seeking the damages").
41 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308, at 836 (2000); see, e.g., Bovsun,
61 N.Y.2d at 227-28, 461 N.E.2d at 846-47, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61 (explaining that
foreseeability is not the sole means of deciding whether a legally cognizable duty is
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type of situation often arises when the defendant's negligence
results in a physical injury to one person and as a result of that
42
physical injury, emotional distress is caused to another.
Though rare, there have even been instances where the Court
has refused to allow recovery for NIED, even after finding that a
duty was owed directly to the person seeking damages for
43
emotional harm.
B. Emotional Distress Suffered by Third Persons
Most courts, including those in New York, are willing to
recognize the right of a plaintiff to sue for emotional damages
resulting from the breach of a duty owed to him or her by the
defendant. 44 However, when the plaintiff suffers emotional
distress as a bystander to the death or serious injury of someone
else, courts have approached this as an issue of limited duty and
limited
in very
recovery
bystander
permitted
have
.45
circumstances
This problem came before the Court of Appeals in Tobin v.
Grossman.46 In Tobin, the plaintiffs two-year-old son was struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant, causing the child
severe injuries. 47 Though the plaintiff did not actually witness
the accident, she heard the defendant's brakes screech and
immediately went outside to observe her severely injured son
lying in the road. 48 The Court held that "no cause of action lies
for unintended harm sustained by one, solely as a result of
injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the
relationship and whether the one was an eyewitness to the
incident which resulted in the direct injuries." 49 The decision
owed, but rather the decision is largely grounded in public policy considerations).

42 See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (elaborating on bystander
recovery for NIED).
43 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978) (explaining that the "calculation of damages for plaintiffs'
emotional injuries remains too speculative to permit recovery notwithstanding the
breach of a duty flowing from defendants to themselves").
44 See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 308, at 836.
45 See Bousun, 61 N.Y.2d at 227, 461 N.E.2d at 846, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 360
("Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to recognize any liability for the mental
distress which may result from the observation of a third person's peril or harm.").
46 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
47 Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 420, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
48 Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
49 Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The Court saw the
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seemed to be primarily based on the Court's concern that if it was
to recognize a cause of action in this situation, there would be no
way to limit the scope of the liability. 50 Therefore, the Court
found: "It [was] enough that the law establishe[d] liability in
favor of those directly or intentionally harmed." 51 Though the
Court recognized the reality that the loss of or injury to loved
ones, particularly children, gives rise to the risk of indirect
emotional harm to others, it deemed it part of "[t]he risk of living
52
and bearing children."
Almost twenty years after Tobin, the Court adopted a new
approach to bystander liability in its landmark decision Bovsun
v. Sanperi.53 In Bovsun, the Court adopted a narrow zone-ofdanger rule that precisely circumscribed the limits of the duty
owed to some bystanders who suffer emotional distress resulting
from injury to another:
Where a defendant's conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff
in consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her
contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death
inflicted by the defendant's conduct on a member of the

main issue as "whether the concept of duty in tort should be extended to third
persons, who do not sustain any physical impact in the accident or fear for their own

safety." Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. To create this new duty
would be to create a new cause of action. For reasons based on policy and precedent,
the Court declined to do so. Though the Court recognized that the severe injury of a
child would undoubtedly have an emotional impact on the child's mother, it did not
consider this to be a sufficient enough justification for the creation of a new tort
concept. See id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. "[T]here are no new
technological, economic, or social developments which have changed social and
economic relationships and therefore no impetus for a corresponding legal
recognition of such changes. Hence, a radical change in policy is required before one
may recognize a cause of action in this case." Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 558.
50 See id. at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. Since the Court was
unable to define a sufficiently limited duty owed to bystanders, it opted to hold that
no duty was owed to bystanders at all. See id. at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 561. The Court did not want to create a cause of action that would
permit any witness of an accident to bring a claim for NIED. See Moore & Gaier,
supra note 6.
51 Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
52 Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
53 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
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plaintiffs immediate family in his or her presence, the plaintiff
54
may recover damages for such injuries.

The Court explained that its adoption of this rule was in no
way creating a new duty; rather, it simply involved a "broadening
of the duty concept" by allowing an immediate family member in
the zone-of-danger, to whom a duty is already owed, to recover an
element of damages not previously allowed. 55 In adopting this
narrow rule, the Court expressly rejected the use of foreseeability
alone as the test of whether a duty is owed to a plaintiff.56 The
Court's rationale for rejecting this approach was grounded in
public policy-more specifically, the fear that such an approach
could lead to unlimited liability. 57 In order to recover for
emotional distress, the Bovsun Court also required that the
plaintiff show not only that his or her emotional injuries were
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, but also that
such injuries are serious and verifiable.5 8 Other than this narrow
zone-of-danger rule, New York courts have rarely recognized
59
liability for emotional injuries based on injuries to loved ones.
In sum, New York will allow recovery for emotional injuries
flowing from physical injuries caused by the defendant's
negligent conduct.6 0
Though New York is willing to allow
recovery for purely emotional injuries, the number of
circumstances in which such recovery will be permitted is
certainly limited. 6 1 In order for a plaintiff to recover for
emotional injuries stemming from a physical injury negligently
54 Id.
at 223-24, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358. In Judge Kaye's
dissent, she insisted that the majority had just created a new duty and cause of
action, thus seriously departing from precedent. See id. at 234, 461 N.E.2d at 850,
473 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
The Court of Appeals later made clear that this rule applied only to the
plaintiffs immediate family, and did not extend to other familial relationships, such
as that between an aunt and a niece. See Trombetta v. Conkling, 82 N.Y.2d 549, 551,
626 N.E.2d 653, 654, 605 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (1993).
5 Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
56 See id. at 227, 461 N.E.2d at 846, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
57 See id. at 227, 461 N.E.2d at 846, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 360. While recognizing that
the zone-of danger rule represented a bright-line circumscription of duty, the Court
explained that "arbitrary distinctions are an inevitable result of the drawing of lines
which circumscribe legal duties, and that delineation of limits of liability in tort
actions is usually determined on the basis of considerations of public policy." Id. at
228, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 231, 461 N.E.2d at 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
59 See Moore & Gaier, supra note 9.
60 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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inflicted upon another, the plaintiff needs to fit within the
narrow zone-of-danger rule. 62 When the Court of Appeals denies
recovery, it is most often because it finds that the defendant did
not owe a duty to the plaintiff.6 3 The determination of whether
or not a duty was owed to a particular plaintiff is almost entirely
64
dependent on public policy considerations.
C. New York's Approach to NIED in Prenatal Claims
It is difficult to imagine damages more foreseeable than the
severe emotional distress, mental anguish, and disappointment
suffered by a woman who has a miscarriage or stillbirth due to
her doctor's malpractice.
However, Bovsun made clear that
foreseeability is not enough in New York. 65
Instead,
foreseeability has often given way to public policy concerns and
the court's fear of opening the floodgates of litigation. These
ideas seem to underlie most of the Court's decisions in this area
66
and have led to unfair or even illogical outcomes.
In deciding whether to permit recovery for NIED to parents
and would-be parents for injuries to their children inflicted
during pregnancy, the main issue for courts is whether a duty
was owed to the parents to protect them from such injury. 6 7 In
Endresz v. Friedberg,68 while disallowing a wrongful death cause
of action on behalf of stillborn fetuses, the Court of Appeals
stated that "[the plaintiff mother] may recover for the injuries
she sustained, both physical and mental, including the emotional
69
upset attending the stillbirths."
This seemingly broad dicta was severely limited by the Court
of Appeals' decisions in Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp.70 and Tebbutt v.
Virostek,71 in which the Court made clear that no recovery was
62 See supra text accompanying note 54.
63 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 41.
65 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
67 See Moore & Gaier, supra note 9.
68 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969). In Endresz, the
plaintiff, while seven months pregnant, was injured in an automobile accident,
resulting in the stillbirth of her twins. See id. at 481, 248 N.E.2d at 902, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 67.
69 Id. at 487, 248 N.E.2d at 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
70 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
71 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985), overruled by
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004).
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permitted for a mother's emotional injuries resulting from the
prenatal injuries to her child absent a showing of an independent
physical injury to her. 72 In Vaccaro, the plaintiff parents brought
several causes of action, including one for NIED, against the
defendant doctor and defendant pharmaceutical company after
their child was born without arms or legs and with other serious
birth defects. 73
The child's injuries were caused by a
progestational hormone manufactured by the pharmaceutical
company and administered by the doctor to the mother during
her pregnancy.7 4 In Tebbutt, the plaintiff sued the defendant
doctor to recover damages for her "pain, severe disappointment,
anxiety, despondency, bitterness and suffering," all of which
resulted from the stillbirth of her child. The fetus' death was
allegedly caused by the defendant doctor's negligently performed
75
amniocentesis.
In both of these cases, the Court rejected the plaintiff
mothers' contention that the defendant doctor owed them a duty
of care that would support a cause of action for NIED. 76 This
position in particular was strongly opposed by the dissenters in
both cases, 77 who asserted that the defendants' actions
78
constituted a breach of a duty owed directly to the mothers.
72 See Tebbutt, 65 N.Y.2d at 932-33, 483 N.E.2d at 1143-44, 493 N.Y.S.2d at
1011-12; Vaccaro, 52 N.Y.2d at 810, 418 N.E.2d at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871. The
Court in Tebbutt distinguished the case before it from its dicta in Endresz by
explaining that the plaintiff mother in Endresz could recover mental injuries
attendant to the stillbirth of her children because the defendant driver breached a
duty to drive with reasonable care that was owed directly to the plaintiff mother.
Tebbutt, 65 N.Y.2d at 933, 483 N.E.2d at 1144, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. On the facts of
Tebbutt, however, the Court found no comparable duty owed to the mother that
would justify the imposition of liability for NIED on the defendant doctor. See id. at
933, 483 N.E.2d at 1144, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
73 Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 272, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1st Dep't
1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
74 Id. at 272, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
75 See Tebbutt, 65 N.Y.2d at 932, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
76 See id. at 932, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. ("[In Vaccaro], we
rejected the contention that the defendants owed any duty to the mother. Similarly,
in the case before us, we must reject the mother's claim for damages for emotional
distress.").
77 See id. at 935-36, 483 N.E.2d at 1145-46, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1013-14 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting). Judge Jasen, who authored one of the dissenting opinions in Tebbutt,
insisted that the doctor owed the mother an independent duty of care arising out of
their professional relationship, as well as the "physiological and biological bond
existing between the mother and her unborn child." Id. at 935-36, 483 N.E.2d at
1145-46, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1013-14.
78 See id. at 936, 483 N.E.2d at 1146, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 ("Defendant's
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Judge Kaye, who authored one of the dissenting opinions in
Tebbutt stated: "Where the law declares that the stillborn child
is not a person who can bring suit, then it must follow in the eyes
79
of the law that any injury here was done to the mother."
Similarly, another dissent in Tebbutt expressed concern that the
majority left unborn children in a "juridical limbo, where
negligent acts, with fatal effect, performed upon the child are
80
neither compensated nor deterred."
Regardless of the strongly worded dissents in both of these
cases, the majority opinions represented binding authority in
New York and were faithfully followed for nearly twenty years.8 '
After Tebbutt, New York courts strictly adhered to the following
rule: "[A] mother [can] not recover for emotional injuries when
medical malpractice cause[s] a stillbirth or miscarriage, absent a
showing that she suffered a physical injury that was both distinct
from that suffered by the fetus and not a normal incident of
childbirth."8 2 This physical injury threshold was extremely
difficult to meet, making recovery for NIED in these types of

infringement upon the mother's freedom from mental distress was occasioned by the

breach of a distinct and independent duty flowing to the mother.").
79 Id. at 940, 483 N.E.2d at 1149, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1017 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Judge Fuchsberg's dissent in Vaccaro made a similar argument:
It would seem impossible to deny that defendants owed a duty directly to
her. She was a patient of the doctor. She was the consumer of the
implicated drug, it having actually been injected into her body. And she
suffered the physical effect it had on the fetus and herself while the baby
was still unborn.
Vaccaro, 52 N.Y.2d at 811-12, 418 N.E.2d at 387, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
80 Tebbutt, 65 N.Y.2d at 933, 483 N.E.2d at 1144, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012 (Jasen,
J., dissenting).
81 See, e.g., Miller v. Chalom, 269 A.D.2d 37, 710 N.Y.S.2d 154 (3d Dep't 2000);
Scott v. Capital Area Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 772, 594 N.Y.S.2d 370 (3d
Dep't 1993); Guialdo v. Allen, 171 A.D.2d 535, 567 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1st Dep't 1991);
Buzniak v. County of Westchester, 156 A.D.2d 631, 549 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d Dep't
1989); Prado v. Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 614, 536
N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1988); Sceusa v. Mastor, 135 A.D.2d 117, 525 N.Y.S.2d 101
(4th Dep't 1988); Burgess v. Miller, 124 A.D.2d 692, 508 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2d Dep't
1986); Kaniecki v. Yost, 166 Misc. 2d 408, 631 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1995); Khan v. Hip Hosp., Inc., 127 Misc. 2d 1063, 487 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1985).
82 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 153, 809 N.E.2d 645, 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d
416, 418 (2004) (citing, discussing, and ultimately overruling the Court's holding in
Tebbutt); see also 76 N.Y. JUR.2D Malpractice § 348 (2003) (explaining the rule
regarding recovery for NIED in prenatal malpractice cases).
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cases rare.8 3
Some mothers, taking a slightly different approach, have
attempted to recover under the zone-of-danger rule.
After
finding it clear from Tebbutt that mothers must assert an
independent physical injury in order to recover for NIED, the
departments of the Appellate Division have generally found the
zone-of-danger rule inapplicable to fetal injuries.8 4 Courts have
also rejected the claim of a father for NIED resulting from his
85
child's in utero injuries under the zone-of-danger rule.
The Court of Appeals, however, has allowed recovery for
NIED stemming from medical malpractice in the abortion
context.
Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical
Center8 6 represents one such case where the Court allowed the
plaintiff to recover for NIED.
In Martinez, the plaintiff
underwent an abortion after the defendant doctors erroneously
advised her that her child would be born with severe birth
defects.8 7 Because the Court found that defendants owed a duty
directly to the plaintiff, she was permitted to recover any
damages, including those emotional in nature, that were caused
88
by the breach of that duty.
83 See Scott, 191 A.D.2d at 773, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 370-71 (denying recovery for
NIED based on mother's "rapid heartbeat, nausea, shortness of breath and chest
pains" because those symptoms were not distinct from the cardiac distress suffered
by the fetus); Guialdo, 171 A.D.2d at 536, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (denying mother's
claim for NIED based on lower abdominal cramping, holding it to be a normal
incident of childbirth, and therefore not actionable); Buzniak, 156 A.D.2d at 632, 549
N.Y.S.2d at 131 (allowing recovery for NIED by holding a staphylococcus infection
caused by a negligently performed amniocentesis, which ultimately resulted in a
miscarriage, to be an independent physical injury); Prado, 145 A.D.2d at 615, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 475-76 (allowing mother's cause of action for NIED based on her fear for
her own physical safety, but not for the stillbirth of her child); Sceusa, 135 A.D.2d at
121, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (holding a Cesarean procedure was not a physical injury,
but rather a surgical procedure that was an acceptable mode of delivery); Khan, 127
Misc. 2d at 1067-68, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (permitting recovery for NIED after a
finding that the excruciating pain and injury suffered by the plaintiff mother was
not typical of childbirth).
84 See, e.g., Miller, 269 A.D.2d at 40, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57; Sceusa, 135
A.D.2d at 119-20, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 102-03; see also Moore & Gaier, supra note 9.
85 See, e.g., Reed v. Cioffi, Seftel & Soni, P.C., 155 A.D.2d 796, 797, 548 N.Y.S.2d
73, 74 (3d Dep't 1989).
86 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
87 See id. at 698-99, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
88 See id. at 699, 512 N.E.2d at 539, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 956. The Court
distinguished the case before it from Tebbutt by finding that the plaintiffs emotional
injuries did not result from what happened to the fetus, but rather from her
undergoing an unnecessary abortion, an act contrary to her beliefs. See id. at 699,
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Similarly, in Ferrara v. Bernstein,8 9 the Court allowed the
plaintiff to recover for NIED after she miscarried following an
The Court likewise reasoned that
unsuccessful abortion. 90
recovery was permitted because the defendant doctor owed a
duty directly to the plaintiff.91
The inconsistencies in this area of the law are apparent:
There may be recovery for emotional distress for stillbirths
caused by automobile accidents but not for those caused by
malpractice; however, there may be such recovery for abortions
undertaken as a result of malpractice. There is no recovery for
the emotional distress of parents whose child is born with
92
severe injuries as a result of either negligence or malpractice.
To this point, the state of the law was that automobile operators,
but not doctors, owed pregnant women a duty not to cause them
emotional distress by negligently causing the stillbirth of their
children. 93 A child born alive, but with birth defects caused by a
doctor, could maintain a cause of action for NIED, 94 but when
presumably more egregious negligence actually resulted in the
95
death of the child, the doctor was insulated from liability.
Finally, a doctor had a duty not to expose a woman to emotional
injuries when advising her whether to undergo an abortion, 9 6 and
when performing an abortion. 97 Despite these inconsistencies, it
took the Court of Appeals nearly twenty years to fill this gap left
by Tebbutt and its progeny.

512 N.E.2d at 539, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
89 81 N.Y.2d 895, 613 N.E.2d 542, 597 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1993).
90 See id. at 897, 613 N.E.2d at 543, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
91 Id. at 898, 613 N.E.2d at 544, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 638 ("Indeed, the breach of
duty owed directly to plaintiff leading to her emotional distress is plainly
compensable under Martinez.").
92 Moore & Gaier, supra note 9. At this point, it had become clear to some that
overruling Tebbutt would significantly improve this area of the law:
It is our view that the time is ripe for at least the rule of Tebbutt to be
overruled, such that there may be recovery for medical malpractice which
results in miscarriages or stillbirths. Such a rule would add a measure of
consistency to this area of law in that stillbirths, miscarriages and
abortions would be treated the same regardless of whether they are due to
motor vehicle accidents or malpractice.
Id.
93 See supra notes 68-69, 72, 76 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 (1951).
95 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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II. BROADNAX V. GONZALEZ AND FAHEY V. CANINO:
THE GAP IS FILLED

A. Facts, Holding, and Rationale
On April 1, 2004, the Court of Appeals overruled a nineteenyear-old precedent when it answered in the affirmative the
question of "whether, absent a showing of independent physical
injury to her, a mother may recover damages for emotional harm
98
when medical malpractice causes a miscarriage or stillbirth."
Two separate cases came together before the Court of Appeals so
this issue could be settled. 99
One of the plaintiffs, Karen Broadnax, was under the care of
the defendants Frederick Gonzalez, an obstetrician, and Georgia
10 0
Rose, a certified nurse-midwife, during her 1994 pregnancy.
On September 25, 1994, a series of traumatic events unfolded,
tragically ending with Karen Broadnax's delivery of a full-term
stillborn girl. 10 1 As a result of these events, Karen Broadnax and
98 See Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 151, 809 N.E.2d 645, 646, 777
N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (2004) (overruling Tebbutt). The 6-1 opinion was authored by
Judge Rosenblatt, with only Judge Read dissenting. Id. at 157, 809 N.E.2d at 650,
777 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
99 Cf.Id. at 151-53, 809 N.E.2d at 646-47, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417-18.
100 See id. at 151-52, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
101 See id. at 151-52, 809 N.E.2d at 646-47, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417-18. Karen
contacted defendant Rose because her water had broken and she had lost a large
amount of blood. Id. at 151-52, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. Karen and
her husband were told to meet defendant Rose at Westchester Birth Center, also a
defendant in the case. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. After
again experiencing vaginal bleeding, Karen was transported to the Columbia
Presbyterian Allen Pavilion in Manhattan at the behest of Dr. Gonzalez. Id. at 152,
809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. This was done despite Karen's suggestion
that she be brought to St. John's Riverside Hospital, which was located across the
street from her location at the Westchester Birth Center. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at
646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. When the Broadnaxes arrived at Columbia Presbyterian,
nearly two hours had passed since their original phone call to defendant Rose. Id. at
151-52, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. Though Dr. Gonzalez had not yet
arrived to meet the Broadnaxes, defendant Rose did not contact the on-call
physician. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The Broadnaxes
waited forty-five minutes at Columbia Presbyterian before Dr. Gonzalez arrived and
decelerations in the fetal heartbeat were detected. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 646, 777
N.Y.S.2d at 417. At this point, Dr. Gonzalez decided to conduct a pelvic and vaginal
examination, rather than perform an emergency cesarean section. Id. at 152, 809
N.E.2d at 646, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 417. Thereafter, Dr. Gonzalez performed a sonogram,
which detected no fetal heartbeat. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 646-47, 777 N.Y.S.2d at
417-18. Dr. Gonzalez performed a cesarean section about a half an hour later, at
which time Karen delivered a full-term stillborn girl. Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 647,
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her husband filed suit against the defendants, "alleging that
their failure to recognize and properly treat [Karen's] placental
abruption supported a cause of action for medical malpractice
' 10 2
and related claims.'
In 1999, the other plaintiff, Debra Ann Fahey, while
pregnant with twins, was under the care of defendant
Dr. Anthony C. Canino and defendant OBGYN Health Care
Associates, P.C.103 Debra Ann Fahey and her husband brought
an action against the defendants after their alleged failure to
diagnose a cervical condition led to the miscarriage and stillbirth
10 4
of both twins.
The Broadnaxes and Faheys petitioned the Court of Appeals
after adverse lower court rulings, both of which relied on Tebbutt
in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for NIED.10 5 Due to its
777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
102 Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
103 Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
104 See id.
at 152-53, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418. During a visit
with Dr. Canino's partner, defendant Dr. Patrick E. Ruggiero, Debra, while in her
eighteenth week of pregnancy, "complained of lower abdominal pains and cramping."
Id. at 152, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418. Dr. Ruggiero concluded that the
pain was being caused by one of the twins pressing against Debra's sciatic nerve. Id.
Two days after her visit with Dr. Ruggiero, Debra telephoned Dr. Canino to
complain of increasing pain and nausea. Id. at 152-53, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777
N.Y.S.2d at 418. Dr. Canino told Debra to lie down, explaining to her that "the pain
was likely related to her sciatic nerve and the nausea probably resulted from
something she ate for lunch." Id. at 153, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
Less than two hours later, Debra gave birth to one of the twins at home, and the
other at the hospital after being transported there by ambulance. Id. at 153, 809
N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418. Tragically, neither of the twins survived. Id. at
153, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418. Debra was later diagnosed with having
an "incompetent cervix," a condition that was later remedied, allowing her to give
birth to a healthy, albeit premature, daughter the following year. Id. at 153, 809
N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
lo5 See Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 304 A.D.2d 781, 781, 759 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (2d
Dep't 2003), rev'd 2 N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004).
There is an absence of evidence that the plaintiff mother suffered a
physical injury distinct from the injury to her unborn child and separate
and apart from that which occurs in any normal childbirth. Thus, she may
not recover damages for the psychological and emotional harm she
allegedly suffered as a result of the stillbirth of her child.
Id. at 781, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; see also Fahey v. Canino, 304 A.D.2d 1069, 1072,
758 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (3d Dep't 2003), rev'd sub nom. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2
N.Y.3d 148, 809 N.E.2d 645, 777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004).
[W]e conclude that the emotional distress for which plaintiff seeks recovery
derives from her concern over what happened to the fetuses and not for a
breach of any duty that defendants owed to her. Therefore, in order for
plaintiff to recover damages under the circumstances presented herein, she
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inability to "defend Tebbutt's logic or reasoning," 106 the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions in Broadnax and
Fahey and overruled its own prior decision in Tebbutt. 0 7 The
Court of Appeals' majority opinion pointed to the "logical gap"
Tebbutt left in the law: "[I]t exposed medical caregivers to
malpractice liability for in utero injuries when the fetus survived,
but immunized them against any liability when their malpractice
caused a miscarriage or stillbirth."10 8
Finally, after several
decades, the Court decided: "It [was] time to fill the gap.' 0 9
Since the fetus is unable to bring suit in a situation that causes
its stillbirth or miscarriage, "'it must follow in the eyes of the
law that any injury here was done to the mother.'"110 The Court
noted that its decision was in accordance with the majority of
other jurisdictions in the country."'
In holding that a mother may recover for emotional distress
when medical malpractice results in a stillbirth or miscarriage,
the Court finally recognized that the treating physician owes a
duty not only to the fetus, but also to the mother:
Although, in treating a pregnancy, medical professionals owe a
duty of care to the developing fetus .... they surely owe a duty
of reasonable care to the expectant mother, who is, after all, the
patient. Because the health of the mother and fetus are linked,
we will not force them into legalistic pigeonholes.
We therefore hold that, even in the absence of an independent
injury, medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth
should be construed as a violation of a duty of care to the
expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional

must demonstrate
that she
suffered
an independent
physical
injury .... Because plaintiffs have failed to tender any evidence that

plaintiff sustained a medically cognizable physical injury beyond that
naturally attendant to childbirth, this cause of action falls within those
cases which preclude the mother's recovery of damages for emotional
distress resulting from the death of a child in utero or postpartum.
Fahey, 304 A.D.2d at 1072, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (citation omitted).
106 Broadnax, 2 N.Y.3d at 153, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
107 See id. at 153, 809 N.E.2d at 647, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
108 Id. at 154, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419. Thus, this "logical gap"
left the fetus in a "juridical limbo." Id. at 154, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at
419.
109 Id. at 154, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
110 Id. at 154, 809 N.E.2d at 648, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (quoting Tebbutt v.
Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 940, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1149, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1017
(1985) (Kaye, J., dissenting)).
11 See id. at 155 n.4, 809 N.E.2d at 649 n.4, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420 n.4.
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distress.112

The majority understood that its holding was a departure
from precedent, but found stare decisis alone insufficient to
support the continuation of a rule that it found to be both unfair
and illogical. 113 The Tebbutt rule represented the Court of
Appeals' effort to limit liability by means of a bright-line
circumscription of duty. "To be sure, line drawing is often an
inevitable element of the common-law process, but the
imperative to define the scope of a duty-the need to draw
difficult distinctions-does not justify ...clinging to a line that
114
has proved indefensible."
B. Judge Read's Dissent
Judge Read dissented from the majority opinion in Broadnax
for several reasons-one being respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis. 115 Judge Read did not think the majority's reasons for
redefining a physician's duty of care to a pregnant woman
justified overruling Tebbutt. 116 In her view, nothing in the
previous twenty years had made the Tebbutt rule outdated or
unworkable. In other words, because the gap referred to by the
majority 1 7 existed in 1985 when Tebbutt was decided, Judge
Read considered the majority's decision to fill it now, in
contravention of precedent, to be unjustified."18
While Judge Read's concerns about the doctrine of stare
decisis are generally well-founded, stare decisis is not enough by
itself to justify adherence to a rule that has consistently produced
unfair and illogical results. Further, the fact that the gap existed
112

Id.

at 154-55, 809 N.E.2d at 648-49, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 419-20 (citation and

footnote omitted). The Court was sure to clarify that its decision was not to be
interpreted as recognizing a similar duty owed by a doctor to the father of a fetus.
Id. at 155 n.3, 809 N.E.2d at 649 n.3, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420 n.3. Where applicable, the

father's recovery is limited to loss of services and consortium. Id. at 155 n.3, 809
N.E.2d at 649 n.3, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420 n.3.
113See id. at 156, 809 N.E.2d at 649, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
114 Id. at 156, 809 N.E.2d at 649, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
115"Stare decisis teaches that 'common-law decisions should stand as
precedents for guidance in cases arising in the future' for substantial reasons of
stability and legitimacy." Id. at 156, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Read,
J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d 477, 488, 663 N.E.2d 607,
613-14, 640 N.Y.S.2d 451, 457-58 (1996) (Simons, J., concurring)).
116 Id. at 156, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
117 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118 See Broadnax, 2 N.Y.3d at 156-57, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421
(Read, J., dissenting).
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when Tebbutt was decided does not necessarily mean that the
Court should not fill it now. In fact, the Court of Appeals itself
said: "Negligence law is common law, and the common law has
been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in many
another case. Our court said, long ago, that it had not only the
right, but the duty to re-examine a question where justice
demands it."119 Judge Read also thought that the rule from
Tebbutt was easy to apply and proved to be workable over the
previous twenty years. 120 Though this is an arguably accurate
observation, it does not appear that courts will have any more
difficulty applying the rule from Broadnax than they did
applying the rule from Tebbutt. In fact, now that the physical
injury threshold 121 from Tebbutt no longer needs to be
surmounted, the rule from Broadnax is arguably easier to apply
and more workable than that from Tebbutt. Under Tebbutt, the
lower courts needed to determine whether a plaintiff suffered an
independent physical injury or whether the plaintiffs injury was
a normal incident to childbirth-a task that historically has not
been easy to undertake. 22 Now, under Broadnax, no such
1 23
determination is necessary.
Though, according to Judge Read, the majority's rule
"expand[ed] existing law sparingly," she expressed concern over
the effect that this expansion of medical caregivers' liability will
have on the cost and availability of gynecological and obstetrical
services.1 24 Judge Read was also apparently uncomfortable with
asking juries to quantify the emotional distress suffered by a
125
mother who has experienced a stillbirth or miscarriage.
Emotional damages flowing from a stillbirth caused by
medical malpractice seem no more speculative than in any other
case where recovery for emotional distress is permitted, such as
when a pregnant woman loses her child due to the negligence of
an automobile operator.1 26 These damages certainly are no more

119

120

Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).
Broadnax, 2 N.Y.3d at 156, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Read, J.,

dissenting).
121 See supra text accompanying note 72.
122 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
123 See supra text accompanying note 112.
124 Broadnax, 2 N.Y.3d at 156-57, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421
(Read, J., dissenting).
125 See id. at 157, 809 N.E.2d at 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
126 See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301
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speculative because they resulted from the negligence of a doctor
rather than an automobile operator. Further, if the level of
damages awarded to these mothers becomes truly overburdensome to the medical industry and public policy so dictates,
a cap on the amount of recovery can always be imposed by New
127
York's legislature.

III.

THE AFTERMATH OF A DECISION

LONG OVERDUE FOR NEW YORK

A. Some Initial (Mixed) Reactions
Almost immediately after the Court of Appeals decided
Broadnax, there was much speculation as to the likely
implications of the decision. 128 Some expressed concern over
what effect this increased exposure to liability would have on the
129
medical community, particularly on the specialty of obstetrics.
Others felt the decision was fair and posed no real threat to the
130
medical community.
There was also speculation as to the amount of damages that
juries could be expected to award for NIED in prenatal medical
malpractice cases. 131 Some predicted that a flood of litigation
N.Y.S.2d 65, 72 (1969) (explaining that emotional damages may be awarded when a
plaintiffs negligent driving causes a woman to deliver a stillborn).
127 Some states have already enacted legislation limiting the amount of recovery
possible for non-economic losses in medical malpractice lawsuits. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 6-5-544 (2005); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1321-102.5 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2005);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483 (2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2005); MO. REV.
STAT. § 538.210 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.43 (West 2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005);
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2004).
128 See, e.g., John Caher, Liability Widens for Fetal Death by Doctors, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 2, 2004, at 1; Marian E. Silber & Maria Elyse Rabar, Damages for Stillbirth:
Will the FloodgatesBe Opened?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 30, 2004, at 3.
129 See Caher, supra note 128 (" 'This type of decision expands, and potentially
very significantly, the exposure of physicians .... Clearly, the facts show there is a
crisis, and this will have an impact on the specialty most in crisis, obstetrics. We are
very concerned."' (quoting Gerard L. Conway, Director of Governmental Affairs for
the Medical Society of the State of New York)).
130 See id. (" 'This recognizes a reality of these terrible situations and brings the
law into conformity with what people's understanding of what justice is .... We
sincerely believe that there is no malpractice crisis and that it is a trumped-up issue
and fraud perpetrated by the insurers.'" (quoting Lenore Kramer, past President of
the New York State Trial Lawyers Association)).
131 See id.
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would follow the decision: "[T]he floodgates have clearly been
opened. The only question is how far." 132 Though Broadnax's full
impact remains to be seen, it did not take long for some of its
implications to surface.
B. Is Vaccaro Still Valid After Broadnax?
Shortly after Broadnax, several members of the legal
community predicted that a likely result of the decision was the
implicit overruling of Vaccaro.133 In fact, it was urged that
reading Broadnax otherwise would lead to an unfair and illogical
result:
Infants that survive but are injured as a result of malpractice
possess their own causes of action, such that there is no gap or
immunity in providing a remedy for wrongful conduct.
However, that does not change the fact that the mother of an
injured child-to whom a duty is owed-may sustain her own
serious emotional injury from the injury to her child....
Denying that mother the right to recover for her emotional
harm would leave a logical gap both in the degree and the
nature of the recovery.
It would likewise be illogical to permit recovery by the mother
whose child is stillborn, but to deny it where the baby dies as a
result of the injuries caused by the same type of malpractice
within minutes, hours, days, or weeks after delivery. 134
It has been asserted that the only logical rule to be derived
from Broadnax's recognition of a duty owed to the mother is that
the mother is permitted to recover for emotional injuries
resulting from any injury to her child sustained prior to and
during birth. 135 "[N]othing in the opinion expressly limit[ed] the
mother's recovery for emotional injury to miscarriages or
36
stillbirths."1
This was precisely the position taken by the Second
Department in Sheppard-Mobley v. King.1 37 In that case, the

See Silber & Rabar, supra note 128.
Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Broadnax' Allows Recovery for
Emotional Distress in Miscarriages, N.Y. L.J., June 1, 2004, at 3 ("[Ihe logical
conclusion is that Vaccaro is no longer valid law.").
132
133

134

Id.

135

See id.

136

Id.

137 10 A.D.3d 70, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't 2004), rev'd, 4 N.Y.3d 627, 830
N.E.2d 301, 797 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2005).
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plaintiff mother gave birth to a child with severe defects due to
the alleged negligence of the defendant doctors. 138 As a result,
the plaintiff brought multiple claims against the defendants,
including one for the emotional distress she suffered as a result
of her child being born in an impaired state. 139 The court found
Broadnaxcontrolling:
[W]e discern no reasonable basis to limit the Broadnax holding
to cases of stillbirth and miscarriage. The duty owed to the
mother remains the same whether the fetus is stillborn or is
born in an impaired state. The duty is not vitiated by virtue of
the live birth of a child in a severely impaired state. In
addition, the cases prior to Broadnax drew no distinction
between miscarriage and stillbirth on the one hand, and the live
birth of a fetus in an impaired state on the other hand, when
they prohibited a mother's recovery for damages for emotional
distress in the absence of independent physical injury to the
mother. 140
At first, it seemed that the Second Department's holding
would be a good indicator of how the rest of the courts would
decide this issue. Its decision not only made logical sense in light
of Broadnax's holding, but it also seemed to be in accord with the
fair and equitable outcome that the Broadnax Court clearly
sought.
Because the Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that a
doctor owes an expectant mother a duty of care, there was no
reason to suppose that this duty would only be recognized for
certain results of negligence but not for others. It seemed logical
to say that this duty exists regardless of whether the subsequent
breach of that duty results in the stillbirth of a child or in birth
defects to a child. On the other hand, it would seem quite

138 See id. at 72-73, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. In Sheppard-Mobley, the pregnant
plaintiff was advised by the defendant doctors to terminate her pregnancy because
she suffered from a condition that rendered successful completion of the pregnancy
unlikely. Id. at 72, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The plaintiff agreed to undergo an abortion
by receiving an injection of the drug methotrexate. Id. at 72, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 99. One
of the defendants allegedly administered an ineffective dose of methotrexate to the
plaintiff. Id. at 72, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 99. By the time the defendants discovered that
the plaintiff was still pregnant, her options were either to undergo a late-term
abortion or give birth to the child. Id. at 72, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. The plaintiff
eventually gave birth to a child with serious birth defects. Id. at 72, 778 N.Y.S.2d at
100.
139 See id. at 73, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
140 Id. at 77, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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illogical to say that the nature of the duty depends on the results
of its subsequent breach. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
disagreed.
In May 2005, the Sheppard-Mobley case reached the Court of
14 1
Appeals, which unanimously reversed the Second Department.
The Court explained: "Our decision in [Broadnax] was intended
to fill a gap created by our previous decision in Tebbutt which
concerned the medical malpractice performed upon the body of
an expectant mother resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth....
[O]ur holding in [Broadnax] [wa]s a narrow one...." 142 Since a
child born with birth defects due to medical malpractice has his
or her own cause of action against the doctor, the Court saw no
reason to also allow the child's mother to collect for her emotional
injuries unless she suffered an independent injury. Instead,
Broadnax was "intended to permit a cause of action where
otherwise none would be available to redress the wrongdoing
143
that resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth."
Regardless of whether one agrees with the Court's decision
in Sheppard-Mobley from a policy standpoint, it can hardly be
argued that it is entirely inconsistent with New York's
jurisprudence in this area. Since New York has a history of
expanding the law in the NIED area sparingly and limiting
liability whenever possible, it is not at all surprising that this
rigid formulation of the Broadnax holding was adopted, and the
Second Department's more expansive reading was rejected.
C. The Limits of Broadnax
Another case that came before the Appellate Division after
144
the Broadnax decision was Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, Inc.
In Shaw, the plaintiff mother sued the defendant medical
providers for NIED after witnessing her daughter nearly
145
suffocate due to a blockage in her ventilator tube.
The court distinguished the case from the situation in
Broadnax and denied recovery to the mother. 146 The court found
141 See Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 4 N.Y.3d 627, 637, 830 N.E.2d 301, 304, 797
N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (2005).
142 Id. at 636-37, 830 N.E.2d at 304, 797 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
143 Id. at 637, 830 N.E.2d at 304, 797 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
144 10 A.D.3d 120, 778 N.Y.S.2d 791 (4th Dep't 2004).
145 See id. at 121-22, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93.
146 See id. at 123-24, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
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controlling the fact that the plaintiff mother in Broadnax was
actually the patient of the doctor, making the duty owed to her a
logical result of the doctor-patient relationship. 1 47 The court saw
the plaintiff mother in Shaw more analogous to the father in
Broadnax, where, because the father was not the doctor's patient,
the court expressly refused to recognize a duty flowing from the
doctor to the father. 148 Likewise, since the mother in Shaw was
not the patient of the defendants, the court held they did not owe
her a duty of care. 149 In so holding, the court made a familiar
public policy argument, expressing its fears of unlimited liability
and opening the floodgates of litigation:
To permit liability under these circumstances would create
untold numbers of claims by third parties. Familial concerns
are present in most instances involving relationships between
health care providers and patients. Quite commonly, close
family members are concerned with a patient's care and
treatment. Were we to permit such liability as is sought by
plaintiffs herein, medical providers would necessarily be
concerned with matters unrelated to their treatment of
1 50
patients.
According to the court in Shaw, the holding in Broadnax is
limited to pregnant mothers, and does not extend to other family
members who may suffer emotional distress as a result of a
family member receiving negligent medical care. Though only
the Fourth Department has spoken on the issue thus far, it is
likely that the rest of the Appellate Division will take the same
position. The Fourth Department's reading of Broadnax seems
accurate, particularly in light of New York's longstanding
tradition of making only minor expansions at a time in recovery
15 1
allowed for NIED.
D. Better Late Than Never-A Change Long Overdue
The Broadnax case itself, coupled with the few cases that
have already followed and interpreted it, make clear that a new
bright-line rule has been created--one that is sufficiently limited
in scope as to remain consistent with the theme of limited
See id. at 123, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
See id. at 123, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
149 Id. at 124, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
150 Id. at 125, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
151 See supra Part I.
147

148
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liability underlying New York's common law in NIED. The new
bright-line rule seems to allow a mother recovery for emotional
distress resulting from a negligently inflicted injury to her child
before or during birth, but only where the negligence results in a
miscarriage or stillbirth.
The Broadnax decision was long overdue in New York. It is
clear, however, that the Broadnax decision, albeit important,
really does "expand [the] law sparingly." 152 The Broadnax
decision seems to rest largely, if not entirely, on the inseparable
and completely intertwined relationship between the mother and
the fetus. There seems to be no familial relationship sufficiently
comparable to this unique relationship that would justify
genuine concerns of unlimited liability for medical practitioners
and opening the floodgates of litigation. It seems unlikely that
Broadnax will be expanded to situations outside of the prenatal
context, or that it will be interpreted as allowing recovery to
anyone other than a pregnant woman. 153
Unfortunately, this change in the law does not have the
power to eliminate all prenatal injuries suffered at the hands of
medical professionals, but it nonetheless accomplishes something
important. When an expectant mother goes to an obstetrician or
other medical practitioner for prenatal care, she expects, whether
or not consciously, that she is owed a duty from this professional
to protect her and her child from harm. The law is now willing to
validate that expectation and allow for compensation when that
expectation, which the mother is undeniably justified in holding,
goes unsatisfied and results in emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
In April 2004, the New York Court of Appeals filled a gap in
recovery permitted for NIED in the prenatal malpractice area.
Now, a mother is permitted to recover for emotional distress
when medical malpractice results in the stillbirth of her child,
regardless of whether the mother suffers an independent
152 Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148, 156, 809 N.E.2d 645, 650, 777 N.Y.S.2d
416, 421 (2004) (Read, J., dissenting).
153The Court of Appeals was careful in expressly eliminating the possibility of
its holding in Broadnax being misunderstood to allow recovery to fathers of injured
fetuses. See supra note 112. Also, in Shaw, the Fourth Department refused to
recognize Broadnax's applicability outside of the prenatal context. See supra text
accompanying notes 144-49.

2006]

PRENATAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

physical injury. Because the mother is actually the patient when
she undergoes prenatal care from a medical professional, it
makes logical sense to recognize that a duty is owed to the
mother, as well as to the fetus. The unique relationship between
a pregnant woman and her fetus ensures that this rule will not
open the floodgates to endless litigation, and also will not result
in unlimited liability for medical professionals. Since this rule is
sufficiently limited in scope and possible application, these
typical public policy concerns do not justify denying recovery.
Though this rule will undoubtedly expose medical professionals
to increased liability for their negligence, it is consistent with
New York's interest in allowing an injured party to seek redress
for a substantial injury. When the Court of Appeals decided to
permit recovery for emotional distress to mothers who lose their
children due to prenatal medical malpractice, it created a new,
workable bright-line rule that has been long overdue for
New York.
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